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Abstract
This paper analyses the case of the privatization of the Spanish tobacco monopoly,
focusing on the period between 1887 and 1896, which corresponds to the  rst leasing
contract between the state and the Spanish Tobacco Company and it is concerned with
two different issues. First, it deals with the effects of privatization on accountability. The
main question examined is whether public and private ownership entail different
approaches to the way in which managers are accountable to owners, and the impact this
issue had on corporate reporting. Second, it is concerned with exploring the
determinants of accounting disclosure. Here, the basic issue is to understand the factors
shaping changes in corporate reporting during the period of study.
Keywords: accounting history; corporate reporting; privatization; tobacco monopoly;
Spain
Introduction
The development of  nancial reporting practices represents an area of growing
interest among accounting scholars. External reporting has been traditionally
assumed to arise as a consequence of the emergence of limited companies in the
nineteenth century (e.g. Bryer, 1993; Edwards et al., 1997; Storrar and Pratt,
2000), a period in which regulatory accounting requirements were low. In such
a context, voluntary disclosure of accounting information has been considered a
basic control device that tends to reduce costs linked to the separation between
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ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Watts, 1977; Fama and Jensen,
1983). However, direct causal relationship between ownership and external
corporate reporting has been contested. For instance, Edwards (1992) compared
the reporting practices in nineteenth-century Britain of three different types of
institutions, non-regulated  rms, regulated  rms and municipal corporations,
 nding similarities that suggest the existence of other additional factors driving
disclosure of accounting information. Toms (1998) points out the in uence of
the social character of share ownership, highlighting the in uence of institutional
factors on  nancial reporting practices. This paper aims to contribute to this
research stream by analysing the privatization of the Spanish tobacco monopoly.
The rise of liberalism since the early years of the nineteenth century induced a
deep and enduring debate about the existence of state-owned monopolies. Public
intervention was strongly reduced, either through privatizing some industries or
simply closing them. The Spanish tobacco monopoly was affected by this trend.
After several failed attempts, in 1887 the management of the industry was
privatized. The privatization entailed the foundation of a privately-owned
company.
The case of the privatization of the tobacco monopoly may be of interest for
several reasons. First, because the privatization took place without any
modi cation in the competitive environment. The monopoly was maintained,
allowing us to isolate the impact of the change in ownership. Second, historical
studies include the temporal dimension in the analysis, allowing us to explore the
incentives for the provision of accounting information (Bryer, 1993; Toms, 1998).
Third, as was mentioned above, the nineteenth century is characterized by the
existence of low regulatory accounting requirements. As Toms (1998) has argued,
the search for determinants of accounting disclosure may bene t from the lack
of a tight regulatory framework. Fourth, research on  nancial reporting
development has extensively focused on the analysis of Anglo-Saxon contexts.
Evidence of other contexts characterized by less developed stock markets, lower
competitive pressures, and stronger state intervention, such as the Spanish one,
may contribute to enhance our understanding of this issue. Finally, the paper
may contribute to broaden our knowledge of nineteenth-century Spanish
accounting practices, about which all too little is known (Herna´ndez Esteve,
1995).
This is the second paper which exploits the historical archives of the Tobacco
Company of Spain in the nineteenth century. Carmona and Macías (2001)
studied the implementation of cost accounting practices in the Royal Tobacco
Factory of Seville during the period 1820–87. This paper is differentiated from
the former since it focuses on the development of  nancial reporting practices in
the company which emerged out of the privatization of the tobacco monopoly
in 1887. Evidence has been gathered from two archives: the Historical Archive of
the Tobacco Company in Seville (AHFTS), which contains copies of the annual
reports, statistics and additional documentation of the privatized company; and
the Historical Archive of the Bank of Spain in Madrid (AHBE), where the
documentation relating to the privatization process is deposited.
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical background
The period under study may be characterized by stability, following a period of
extreme turbulence. Between 1868 and 1874, Spain tested almost every known
form of government,1 before the Bourbon monarchy was restored in the latter
year. The need to build up a broad base of support for the restored monarchy
lead to the construction of a bipolar political game, with conservatives (lead by
Canovas) and liberals (under Sagasta’s leadership) sharing political power in a
peaceful way (Fusi and Palafox, 1997). This situation was possible because of the
integration of the more radical elements, of both the right and the left, inside
these two major political parties, the system being characterized by a strong
pragmatism that exceeded ideological or dogmatic principles. Potential threats to
the system were avoided by establishing an organized political rotation.
Arrangements incorporating corruption, political manipulation, and fraud were
established by which a peaceful turnover of political parties in of ce was assured,
thereby protecting and consolidating the political system (Comellas, 1996). From
an economic perspective this period appears characterized by a steady, though
slow, rate of economic growth. Public  nances experienced a signi cant
improvement, the level of public debt decreasing from 16,070 million pesetas in
1875 to 7,659 million in 1882 (Comin, 1997). Moreover, the public debt as a
ratio of Gross National Product fell from 1.38 to 0.70, re ecting one of the most
favourable economic conditions of the century (Tortella, 1995). At the end of the
century, the economic and political climate deteriorated, this trend being
intensi ed by the Cuban war (1895) and the  nal loss of overseas territories after
the war against the USA in 1898.
The Spanish tobacco monopoly under public management
At the time of privatization, the tobacco industry was a complex one. It consisted
of nine factories, 48 provincial warehouses, 549 ‘dependent administrations’, and
more than 18,000 tobacconists. Public management was characterized by two
basic features. First, multiple agents took care of the different aspects of the
industry. The monopoly comprised three different and separated activities: the
import of raw material and  nished products from overseas colonies; manu-
facturing; and distribution and sale. The responsibility for the import of raw
material was shared among the ‘Dirección General de Rentas Estancadas’
(Steering Agency for State Monopolies, SASM) and the ‘Dirección General de
Contabilidad’ (Steering Agency for Accounting, SAA). Manufacturing activities
fell under the responsibility of the SASM, although the  ow of funds were
managed by the provincial structure of the ‘Dirección General del Tesoro
Público’ (Steering Agency for Public Treasure). Distribution and sale of  nished
products were as well under the responsibility of the Steering Agency for Public
Treasure. Distribution was organized in three steps. Provincial warehouses
received tobacco products from the factories according to the expected
consumption in the province they served. From there, products were sent to
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘dependent administrations’ that covered a smaller territory and,  nally, to the
tobacconists as invoices were received. Finally, one of the critical aspects of
the industry, the  ght against smuggling, was the responsibility of the Army.
This organization introduced additional complexity to the management of the
industry, which appears to have been characterized by the tension between
centralization in decision making and the degree of non-compliance with the
rules. Liberals tried to increase rationality in the public administration, in order
to avoid corruption and fraud. As far as the tobacco industry was concerned,
seeking for higher rationality meant the implementation of several bureaucratic
procedures and the attempt to centralize decision-making.
Although decision making was highly centralized, the lack of compliance lead
to a divorce between decision making and action, reinforced by the political
instability and the subsequent high turnover of the head of cers of the Ministry,
that characterized this historical period. For instance, Carmona and Mac´õ as
(2001) provide evidence as to the variety of responses exhibited by the Tobacco
Factory of Seville to institutional pressures implementing budgets and cost
calculations. This represented a major obstacle to providing an adequate global
vision of the industry from a managerial viewpoint. Finally, and as a
consequence, direct public management revealed itself as unable to design and
implement a consistent plan of reforms in order to improve the industry’s
performance.
The industry, though pro table, faced deep ef ciency problems, being the
major problem assuring an adequate supply of tobacco products (Ga´lvez-
Muñoz, 1997). Throughout the nineteenth century the industry confronted a
situation of excess demand (Com´õ n and Mart´õ n Aceña, 1999) that was
increasingly aggravated by the bureaucratic procedures and the sluggishness in
responding to customer’s changing patterns of demand. As a consequence,
production was severely unbalanced, and while some highly demanded products
were not adequately supplied, others were manufactured simply to be stored
(Delgado, 1896). Additionally, administrative rules tied the management of the
industry so as to impede any rationalization of manufacturing operations, and
raising expenses in critical areas such as transport and purchases.
Second, control mechanisms were characterized by their bureaucratic nature.
Although the different agencies were subject to several administrative controls,
these mechanisms lacked a managerial perspective, focusing on either political or
legal aspects. That is, emphasis was laid mainly upon budget and expenses
control, trying to ensure a ‘proper’ (legal) use of both  nancial and material
resources. Management of the so-called ‘Tobacco Income’ was the responsibility
of the government, who had to render accounts to Parliament, this control
being of a political nature. To effect such control, the government required
information from the of ces, information that had to be examined and audited
both by the SAA and the ‘Tribunal Superior de Cuentas’ (Higher Accounting
Court). It is important to note that, following the organizational structure,
accounting information did not offer a general picture of the industry, but
presented fragmented information on the different areas. Moreover, these
agencies oversaw the conformity to the legal rules, but not the ef ciency of the
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
industry management. As a consequence, the pro tability of the industry was
not consistently and accurately calculated.
The privatization of the tobacco monopoly
Motivations for privatizing the industry appear to have been grounded in both
ideological and practical factors. As was mentioned above, liberalism brought
about a signi cant reduction in state intervention. Privatization of state-owned
companies, which extended to include the tobacco industry, was one of the most
important manifestations of this trend. However, the importance of the industry
as source of income for the state;2 the poor condition of public  nances; and the
political instability that characterized the nineteenth century led to an ever
changing treatment of the industry (Tejerizo, 1975). Debates involved both
issues of deregulation vs monopoly and private vs public management. In 1813,
1821, 1855, 1866, and 1869 the industry was liberalized but shortly after each
change, the monopoly was reinstated, either for political or  nancial reasons. In
1844 the tobacco industry was leased to a private company but, once again, a
political change resulted in the restoration of direct public management.
However, in the last quarter of the century, the situation changed and the
country entered a period of calmness, both at the political and economic level. In
such a context the tobacco industry was de nitively leased in 1887 to a private
company, the monopoly however being retained.
By 1887, investment was clearly needed in order either to modernize the
industry, such as through the mechanization of some of the productive processes,
or to expand the productive capacity through adding new factories to the already
existing ones while retaining the existing hand-craft production methods
(Alonso A´lvarez, 1996). Privatization was supported by the idea that private
management would engage in the needed reforms. According to the Treasury
Minister who decided upon the privatization, López Puigcerver, the main-
tenance of public management confronted three major problems: (i) the level of
investment required to expand supply; (ii) the speed of the reforms which, under
public management, would be slower due to the bureaucratic procedures
involved; and (iii) the turnover of head of cers in the Ministry, which presented
serious dif culties to the design and implementation of a plan of reforms.
Therefore, in the opinion of López Puigcerver, the best option was to lease the
industry, without deregulating it (Torres Villanueva, 1998).
The Spanish privatization process was inspired by the Italian experience of
1867 (Delgado, 1896). In Italy, the high pro ts earned by the privatized tobacco
company provoked, at the end of the contract, the reinstatement of direct public
management. The Spanish Treasury Minister, in order to avoid such a problem,
established strict conditions over the company’s activities.
The articulation of the privatization represents a crucial feature in under-
standing the evolution of corporate reporting. Whereas the privatization process
was organized as a public auction, the government tried to ensure that a
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
particular candidate, the Bank of Spain, would win the bid and, directly or
indirectly, take care of the industry. At that time, the Bank of Spain was a large
joint stock company, listed on the Madrid stock market. Several reasons might
explain the government behaviour. First, it wanted to guarantee the success of
the privatization and the protection of the tobacco monopoly. Second, the Bank
of Spain, though being a private company, was strongly dependent upon the
government. They were linked via several  nancial businesses and these other
activities would act as collateral. Finally, it was a solidly-based organization that
could supply the required  nancial resources.
The Bank of Spain, at  rst, was reluctant to engage in an industry that could
‘denature its exclusive  nancial mission’ (Comisión para el arrendamiento,
Legajo 954, AHBE). The government tried to reverse this attitude by providing
information about the state and pro tability of the monopoly and, more
importantly, linking the co-operation of the Bank in this matter with their
 nancial businesses. That is, if the Bank wanted to continue to be the treasurer
of the state, to continue to run the operations of the public debt and gold, and
to continue to act as a collector of taxes, then it had to take care of the tobacco
industry as well (Legajo 954, Operaciones, AHBE). The Bank decided to help
the government by bidding for the monopoly. In order to reduce the risk to
itself, the Bank decided to create a new company, in which other important
 nancial groups would participate, to manage the industry. However, the Bank
arranged to retain a suf ciently large share of the new company’s capital to
provide it with control over the monopoly. The capital of the Compañía
Arrendataria de Tabacos (CAT) was  xed at 60 million pesetas, the Bank
retaining half of the shares, the other half being distributed amongst the other
 nancial groups.
The law authorizing the leasing of the monopoly was enacted on the 22 April
1887 (Legajo e-22301, AHBE). The law required that the lessee should be a
Spanish company, independent of foreign groups. The term of the contract was
 xed at 12 years, and the lease was secured by a deposit by the company of a
security 20 million pesetas, in order to protect the state’s interests from
opportunism and to ensure the company’s compliance with all of the contrac-
tual conditions. The lease was organzed as an operating franchise, thereby
avoiding the need for the new company to acquire the long-term assets.
Nevertheless, the level of  nancial resources needed to bid for the monopoly was
substantial.3
The contractor was required to pay a yearly rental which was composed of a
 xed amount (canon) plus a variable amount that depended on the pro ts of the
year (participation in pro ts). For calculation purposes, the term of the contract
was split into four sub-periods. The canon was  xed at 90 million pesetas
for the  rst three years. In the second sub-period, the  xed amount would be
the mean of the net income corresponding to the second and third years
of the contract. In the third and fourth sub-periods, the  xed amount would be
the mean of the prior sub-period. The net income would be calculated as
follows:
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ Operating revenues (Sales revenue + Commissions on sale of foreign and
colonial products)
– Cost of goods sold
– General administrative expenses
– Manufacturing expenses corresponding to the sold products
– 5 per cent interest on invested capital (excluding the fee).
The variable part of the rental depended on the difference between the net
income and the canon. If the former was lower than the  xed amount established
for that period, the CAT would have to bear the loss. In the opposite case, the
surplus would be shared on an equal basis between the state and the company.
The relevance of accounting was enhanced by the fact that it represented the
basis for the calculation of the rental. This account had to be submitted to
the Treasury in order to be supervised and approved. The Treasury wanted
to make sure that the expenses were proportional to the level of production.
The calculation of the rental represented a major concern for the CAT. The
problem was not linked to its amount (though the 90 million pesetas established
for the  rst three years greatly exceeded the outcomes ever obtained by the
tobacco monopoly) but to the calculation of the  xed canon. It became evident
that under the method set down, the company had no incentive to increase the
pro tability of the industry, since any increase in one period would be translated
into a higher  xed amount in the following period, the Treasury being the only
bene ciary (Delgado, 1896). Thus, in the annual report of 1888–9 Amós
Salvador, president of the CAT complained about this issue:
Because of the clauses of the lease contract, that is, in view of the dispositions
of the law of the 22 April 1887, the losses experienced by the Company are to
be borne by itself, while the monopoly pro ts are not only to be shared with
the State, but produce an increase in the canon for the following period. As a
consequence it follows that the Company has no essential interest in
developing these pro ts; because if the Income experiences a progressive
improvement, the pro ts it will receive in a period is less than the pro t that
it will receive in the next, by virtue of the increase in the canon; but it
happens that if Income falls, in this case, because of the pro ts achieved in the
former period and due to the increase in the canon, a loss, maybe irreparable,
for the Company will be derived.
(Memor´õ a 1888/89, CAT. AHFTS)
On the other hand, at the business level, decision making in relation to crucial
aspects such as investment, product mix, pricing and human resources were the
subject of intervention by the public administration. For instance, article 11
imposed on the CAT the maintenance of the existing products, any modi cation
in their composition, number or price requiring the approval of the government.
Likewise, new investment in factories and warehouses were  xed by the contract
(article 8), as was the case of manufacturing employees, where the contractor was
required to keep 75 per cent of the workers in every factory (article 8). The
contract also included public monitoring mechanisms. A governmental delegate,
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
who could impose a veto on any decision potentially likely to damage the public
interest, was placed at the company’s headquarters (article 22).
As the conditions imposed by the contract were severe, private management
of the tobacco industry did not result in a dramatic increase in the volume of
production, nor in pro tability or in the level of investment. The  nancial
pressure, the limited competencies of the CAT in respect of investment or
production strategies, and the required maintenance of employment impeded
the introduction of mechanization. As a consequence, the Company focused its
cost-cutting activities on the reorganization of the work in the factories. Three
main objectives were pursued: (i) the achievement of a common organization
that could clearly set duties, responsibilities and accountability at all levels of the
hierarchy; (ii) increasing uniformity within production processes and products;
and (iii) the augmentation of the quality of production:
Surely, everyone can easily realise the important dif culties the Company is
facing in order to achieve the desired organisation of the Factories, which can
be said to be as diverse in its development as the number of existing factories.
Prescribing the former organisation, developing a new one that allows us to
allocate to all and every employee their pertinent duties, will make possible the
assignment of responsibility for the faults they may cause, and will assure
order and regularity in those facilities [. . .]. In this way the Company is trying
to achieve improvements in the quality of production, economies in
manufacturing activities and the required organisation in the factories.
(Annual Report 1888/89: 11)
A critical factor in achieving these objectives was to enhance discipline within
the factories. The CAT tried to reduce the level of absenteeism and to establish
rigid timetables. However, in this aspect it had to  ght against a strongly
internalized work culture.4 Only the massive introduction of machines in the
twentieth century made it possible to impose a tighter disciplinary regime on
cigar rollers (Valde´s, 1989; Baena, 1993; and Ga´lvez Muñoz, 1997). Mechaniza-
tion required a completely different organization of the workshops, and entailed
a different relationship between worker and products as control over the whole
production process was no longer held by individual workers.
The CAT could improve the pro tability of the industry by rationalizing
distribution. Outbound logistics were redesigned, in an attempt to eliminate the
sequence of factories-provincial warehouses-dependent administrations in those
cases where sea or railway transport represented effective alternatives. In this
way, cost savings were achieved, both by pro ting from cheaper modes of
transport and by reducing damage and waste in merchandise. For instance, the
statistics included in the 1891 Annual Report showed a decline in the ratio of
transport expenses to total expenses from 1.484 per cent in 1887, to 1.078 per
cent in 1891. Cost savings were also achieved in the acquisition of secondary
materials (paper, boxes, etc.). For example, new contracts with paper suppliers
allowed a saving 2 million pesetas in 1887/88; in that same year there was also
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an average decrease in the cost of each bottle of 1.5 pesetas (Delgado, 1896). In
spite of these efforts, during the  rst three years, CAT incurred losses (see Table
1). From 1890/91, however, CAT recorded pro ts and distributed dividends
accordingly from 1892.
Privatization and accountability
The association between accountability and ownership is well established in the
literature. The relationship between shareholders and managers is an agency
relationship that brings about the need for monitoring manager’s activities. It is
assumed that expenses in monitoring will tend to reduce agency costs,
publication of accounting reports representing one of the major monitoring
devices. Disclosure of accounting information has been seen for a long time as an
effective means of ensuring that managers would act in the interest of
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
A major factor explaining the emergence and severity of agency problems is
diffuse ownership of larger enterprises (Demsetz, 1995). Owners of a corpora-
tion that is very diffusely owned have low incentives, or are unable, to discipline
professional management. Changes in ownership structure are, therefore,
assumed to in uence the incentives for monitoring management’s activities. This
is especially true of privatization processes. In state-owned  rms or activities, the
ultimate owners, the citizens, have little incentive to control managers, since they
delegate control to the state, and cannot claim for residual cash  ows.
The economic literature predicts changes in management behaviour as a
consequence of the emergence of new business relationships and constraints
(Stiglitz, 1988; Parker, 1993): (i) managers may be answerable to shareholders;
(ii) the threat of shareholders will depend upon the cost of monitoring
managerial effort and upon the concentration of their power. Managers, under
the pressure of internal and external controls, will tend to follow those strategies
that result in shareholder satisfaction. In addition to the responsibility towards
shareholders, managerial activities will be controlled externally (Jensen, 1989;
Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989). Stock markets, through the threat of take-over
(Wright and Thompson, 1994), and the threat of bankruptcy (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1988; Stiglitz, 1989), will contribute to the monitoring of managers.
In general, research has addressed cases in which ownership determines both
the objective and the monitoring systems of the  rm (see Bo¨s, 1991). The basic
assumption is that, in public  rms, the state monitors the managers in order to
maximize social bene ts, while in private  rms the management of the  rm is
controlled through the capital market (or  nancial organizations) in order to
ensure pro t maximization. Monitoring systems in public  rms are expected to be
bureaucratic, accountability being characterized by its focus on conformity to legal
rules. On the contrary, under private management the main concern is to ensure
the ef cient use of  nancial resources.
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Annual reports of the CAT
The privatization of the Spanish tobacco monopoly meant a change in the object
of control, emphasizing economic aspects, instead of the legal ones that
constituted the central concern under public administration. The privatization
implied the creation of a joint stock company. The 1885 Code of Commerce
which regulated limited liability companies included requirements for the
publication of monthly and yearly balance sheets, but gave no insights as to
particular requirements or criteria by which to present accounting information.
A monthly balance sheet was drawn up by CAT, both as a result of legal
requirements (article 157 of the Code of Commerce) and for the purpose of
determining interim dividend payments (article 35 of the Company’s Statutes).
However, while the emergence of  nancial reporting appears to have been
primarily linked to the change in the legal framework, the content of the annual
reports largely exceeded both legal requirements and the disclosure practices of
private industry generally.
The board of directors was required, according to the statutes of the
Company, to present to their shareholders at the company’s annual general
meeting a balance sheet. This statement should include ‘all the Company’s
accounts related to the period, that have to be submitted to the shareholders for
approval adding the proper justi cations and the memory of the operations’ (leg.
no. 1, e 23510, AHBE). ‘Justi cations’ were provided mainly through a large
number of  nancial statements, as will be shown below. The ‘memory’ of the
operations lead annual reports to comprise highly detailed narrative descriptions
of the main activities developed by the  rm, focusing especially on the problems
the company was facing. It also included a section detailing the evolution of the
 rm’s activities throughout the period that had elapsed between the drawing up
of the yearly accounts (30 June) and the annual general shareholders meeting,
which was held in February.
The early reports were variable in nature, there being differences both in
the number and the structure of the  nancial statements. However, the statements
may be grouped into three main categories: (i) balance sheet and income state-
ments; (ii) statements providing greater detail in relation to the income statement;
and (iii) statements providing information on the operations carried out during
the year.
Balance sheet and income statements were supposed to provide a summarized
and general outline of the company’s situation, while the other statements
provided further information both on the items in the income statement and on
managerial aspects. The structure of the balance sheet (see Figure 1) re ects
the peculiarities of the leasing contract, the most important features being as
follows:
The balance sheet included three different categories of long-term assets. As
the privatization was organized as an operating franchise, ownership of the assets
as at 22 June 1887 was retained by the state. The company was transferred the
right to use and exploit those assets, with a duty of returning them in good
condition to the state at the end of the contract. Therefore, these assets were
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
recorded both as assets and liabilities. The last category comprised the
investment undertaken by the company, whether signi cant improvements to
state-owned assets, or the purchase of new ones. These investments were to be
acquired by the state at the end of the contract.
In a similar vein, depreciation, while considered, was not included in the
balance sheet. Since depreciation only affected the calculation of the yearly
pro t, it was therefore only included in the income statement. Moreover,
depreciation expenses were not recognized by the state in the calculation of the
rental, affecting only the company’s net income. The reason why is to be found
Source: Memorõ´ a CAT, 1887/88, AHFTS
Figure 1 Balance sheet of CAT as at 30 June 1888 (translation)
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in the articulation of the privatization as a lease. All assets were supposed to
revert to public ownership at the termination of the lease and the matter of
depreciation would only be considered at that time, to determine the value
of assets, both so as to establish whether the company had any additional
responsibility re. state-owned assets, and to estimate the purchase price of the
assets purchased by the company during the period of the lease. Depreciation
was not, however, consistently considered. For instance, in 1887/88 and
1890/91, the income statements failed to show depreciation expenses. By
1892/93, however, the company also included depreciation of ‘organization’
costs, i.e. capitalized costs linked to prepaid expenses of the central of ces.
This inconsistency in the presentation of the balance sheet is especially
noticeable in relation to gains. These included, in different ways, unrealized
gains on stored products. In some periods these gains were recorded as the
‘Difference between provisional cost and sale price of stored products’ or as
‘Unrealized gains’, while in other accounting periods gains were disclosed,
including ‘Provisional cost of products’ with debit balance, and ‘Gains on
products sale’. Both ‘Gains on product sale’ and the ‘Difference between
provisional cost and sale price of stored products’ were important items, which
represented around 45 per cent of total liabilities and shareholders’ equity.
Two income statements (see Figures 2 and 3) were provided in order to show
the evolution (Annual Reports of the CAT, 1887–96) of both the pro ts and
losses for the shareholders and the evolution of the tobacco income for the
Treasure. The criteria to determine both outcomes were not equivalent,
therefore, income statements also provided a ‘reconciliation’ of both  gures. The
Treasury only accounted for economic operations;  nancial incomes and
expenses, and gains or losses derived from changes in the market value of
 nancial assets were not included as elements in order to determine the rental.
Likewise, some value adjustments relating to raw materials and other manu-
facturing expenses, and the payment of the rental were not included in the
calculation of net income.
The other statements provided highly detailed information on such issues as:
production volume per factory and product; product costs; product margins;
tobacco leaves consumed in the different production processes, waste and
inef ciency; personnel, overheads, bottling and packing expenses; and a general
statement of sales, including both manufactured and imported products. As an
example, the 1888–9 annual report included the following accounting
statements:
1. Balance sheet
2. Income statement for the
‘tobacco income’
3. Income Statement for the
Company
4. Gains on sale of Spanish
products
5. Gains on sale of Cuban
products
6. Gains on sale of Philippine
products
7. Gains on sale commissions of
Philippine and Canary Islands
products
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Sales revenues of con scated
products 
9. Import taxes over tobacco
imports
10. Financial pro ts
11. Expenses in the commercial
provincial structure
12. Central administration general
expenses, expenses in  ghting
against smuggling, central
distribution and general store
of Santander expenses
13. Manufacturing cost by factories
14. Tobacco leaves invested
15. Gains on tobacco leaves in the
Company’s factories
16. Losses on tobacco leaves in the
Company’s factories
17. Destroyed packing and bottling
18. Reparation expenses
corresponding to wooden
packing
19. Remaining packing stored in
the administrations
20. Restored packing valued at
contractual price
21. Gains on sale of waste
22. Statement showing the
distribution of the balance of
losses and gains on tobacco
leaves, which are apportioned
to the manufactured products
23. Statement showing
manufacturing costs, which are
apportioned to the
manufactured products
24. Statement showing stored
tobacco leaves at the end of the
period 1887–8 and those
acquired in the period 1888–9
25. Tobacco leaves stored at the
end of June 1889
26. General summary of tobacco
and bottling sales
27. Stored Peninsular tobacco and
Havana and Philippine cigars,
old contracts, as at June 1889
28. Stored modern Cuban products
as at June 1889
29. Stored Philippine products,
new contracts, as at June 1889
Additionally, the notes to the annual reports offered information on the
 rm’s activities, focusing especially on cost improvements. Statistics (Annual
Report, 1890/91, CAT) re ecting the evolution of manufacturing costs, gross
margin, transport and distribution costs showed the effort the company was
expending in order to enhance performance, emphasizing the growing ef ciency
in the use of raw materials (see Table 2). The company tried to justify the losses,
explaining carefully the dif culties it was facing, given the constraints of the
contract, and focusing its comments on those variables, such as transport or
distribution, that were under the  rm’s control.
The main change in corporate reporting is found to occur in 1893/94. At this
time the information included in the annual reports experienced a dramatic
reduction, both in terms of the narrative account and the  nancial information
disclosed. Only the balance sheet and income statements were included, all
the remaining items being discarded. This change was justi ed by the  rm
in the following terms: ‘those documents are not going to be published this
year, because, given their development, the Board of Directors thought it
was convenient to omit them from the Memory . . .’ (Annual Report,
1893/94: 12).
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Income statement of CAT, 1888 (translation)
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of accounting disclosure
Accounting literature has addressed the study of voluntary accounting disclosure
from a variety of perspectives. Several factors have been found to be signi cant
in explaining the level of disclosure. Incentives to provide information have been
found to increase with  nancial leverage (e.g. Dhaliwal, 1980; Chow, 1982;
Bradbury, 1992), when  rms quote at stock markets (e.g. Leftwich et al., 1981);
the more diffused is ownership (e.g. McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993) or the
higher is market uncertainty (Sengupta, 1998). Hence, theory development and
empirical work has yielded mixed results and the determinants of accounting
disclosure are still not well developed.
Ownership structure and corporate reporting
Ownership structure has been traditionally considered a major determinant of
voluntary disclosure of information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).
Berle and Means (1932) developed the separation thesis, which contends that
corporate ownership is widely diffused among small shareholders unable to
impose a certain discipline on managers. In the absence of effective shareholder
control, the only effective way to assure that managers are acting in the interest
Source: Memorõ´ a 1888–9, CAT (AHFTS)
Figure 2 (continued)
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of shareholders is full disclosure of information. However, while ownership
structure is clearly highly diffused among large corporations, ownership appears
to be suf ciently concentrated to provide strong incentives to large shareholders
to in uence management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;
Demsetz, 1995). As a consequence, monitoring and control costs will be lowered
when the rights of control are concentrated in large shareholders with presence
on the board of directors (Jarrel and Poulsen, 1987; Agrawal and Mandelker,
1990; Prevezer and Ricketts, 1994) reducing incentives to disclose
information.
The evidence put forward in this paper is not consistent with this argument.
By 1888, the  ve major shareholders controlled 33.36 per cent of the capital with
only a further 50 shareholders possessing more than 200 shares (representing
13.23 per cent of total capital). When the  rst shareholder’s annual meeting took
place, there where two main shareholders: the Bank of Spain (which owned 20.5
per cent of the shares) and the Urquijo Bank (7.63 per cent). The remaining
capital was distributed among a widely dispersed set of shareholders. Under the
Company’s Statutes, only shareholders owning more than 20 shares had a right
to attend, and to vote at, the annual meeting. With a total of 885 such
shareholders, and the Company’s Statutes requiring a two-thirds majority on any
vote, the Bank of Spain was able to exercise a signi cant degree of control over
the company’s activities.
The dominant position of the Bank of Spain was strengthened because of
three additional factors. First, the Bank became the sole  nancial institution
serving CAT and, thus, intervened in all its activities (article 37 of the
Company’s Statutes, AHBE). Second, the Bank had a majority of the members
of the board of directors:
Once the issue of the social capital was solved, the Commission thought that
it should reserve for the Organisation the majority in the Board of the new
Society, as a fundamental guarantee of the franchising management, both to
the Bank itself and to HM. government in their reciprocal relationships.
(AHBE, Operaciones, no. 954. Arrendamiento de la renta del tabaco.
Estado actual de la cuestión)
Table 2 Ratio statistics included in the CAT Annual Report 1890/91
(All  gures are percentages)
Manufacturing
cost to sales
value of
production
Income
to cost
Income to cost
of Peninsular
products
Transport cost
to total
manufacturing
cost
Distribution costs
to total
manufacturing
cost
1887/88 32.417 208.477 206.076 1.484 5.075
1888/89 29.833 235.196 227.119 1.306 4.839
1889/90 29.376 240.403 241.207 1.146 4.813
1890/91 27.782 259.937 247.106 1.078 4.688
Source: Memor õ´ a 1890/91 de la CAT, AHFTS.
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eleven members comprised the board of directors: the general manager and
vice-director of CAT,  ve members of the Bank of Spain’s board and four
representatives of the remaining shareholders. Additionally, the general manager
of the company was the president of the board. Management was completely
centralized in the board of directors whether at the strategic or the business
level. Third, the Bank was locked in to this investment. Whereas other
shareholders could easily sell their shares on the stock market, the Bank was
linked to the tobacco business by the commitment it had entered into with the
government. Therefore, it had a strong incentive to exert direct control.
The particular circumstances that forced the Bank of Spain to bid for and
manage the tobacco monopoly provided a great incentive for it to participate in
the management of the business. While strong incentives for direct monitoring
are assumed to be associated with low disclosure of accounting information,
annual reports from 1887 through 1893 included large amounts of  nancial and
managerial information. Financial reporting could have been in uenced by the
Bank of Spain’s own disclosure practices which exceeded both legal require-
ments and industry practice (Annisette and Macías, 2002). However, in spite of
the lack of change in the leading role played by the Bank, the CAT’s disclosure
policy had changed dramatically by 1893/94. Hence, whilst the emergence of
corporate reporting appears to be linked to ownership transfer, other additional
factors are required to explain changes in the information disclosed. Fur-
thermore, whereas theory has focused on assuming the emergence of a new
managerial class as a major determinant of  nancial accountability, this case
provides additional evidence of situations in which capital interests prevailed
(Bryer, 1993; Toms, 1998).
Stock markets,  nancial institutions, and corporate reporting
Accounting disclosure can be explained in terms of funding needs. It is assumed
that  rms will tend to increase the level of information provided to stock markets
and  nancial institutions, trying to either ease the capture of resources or limit
the consequences of bad performance (Dhaliwal, 1980; Chow, 1982; Bradbury,
1992).
The new company went public shortly after its foundation, being listed on the
Madrid Stock Market. During the  rst three years the company’s share price
showed a decline as a consequence of the  rm’s losses, the index of share price
to par value (100) falling from 113.9 in 1887 to 87.8 in 1891 (Comín and Mart´õ n
Aceña, 1999). From then on, the trend was reversed, and the share price
experienced a continuous rise (1893: 155.3; 1899: 295.7; and 1900: 409.1). This
rise was in marked contrasted to share prices generally, the stock market
experiencing a strong crisis from 1895 to the end of the century, provoked by
factors such as the international crisis and the subsequent massive withdrawal of
foreign capital from the Spanish market, the assassination of Prime Minister
Ca´novas, which increased political uncertainty, and the loss of the colonies
(ICAGBM, 1981).
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The in uence of the stock market on CAT appears to have been limited for
two main reasons. First, it is important to remark that the Spanish Stock
Exchange was not very active as it was mainly devoted to trading public debt
securities. The number of listed private companies was low (28 in 1874; 48 in
1882 and reaching only 60 by 1900). Railways, mining and  nancial institutions
with a large proportion of foreign capital represented the bulk of private shares
(SRBVM, 1993). Additionally, the in uence of a stock market is based on the
relevance of public information for shareholders. However, large Spanish
investors constituted a small and powerful elite that participated in all the
important  nancial operations and had access to private sources of information
(e.g. Ringrose, 1996; Cruz, 1996, 2000; de la Fuente, 2000).5 Second, the
company itself had a limited dependence on the capital market as a provider of
funds. On the one hand, the capital structure remained stable throughout the
period of study: no additional capital was issued. On the other hand, as the Bank
of Spain was the sole  nancial institution with which the company could deal,
accounting disclosure cannot be assumed to have derived from the need to
reassure fund providers.
Market uncertainty
Sengupta (1998) contends that market uncertainty has a positive impact on
accounting disclosure. He argues that suspicion regarding the capacity of  rms
to survive (that is, when the market uncertainty is high), increases incentives to
disclose information. In the case of the privatization of the tobacco monopoly,
the company had to face uncertainty emerging from different sources.
The privatization of the tobacco monopoly was justi ed by the government in
terms of the superior ef ciency that private management would achieve, and the
resultant increase that would accrue in the state’s revenues. The privatization
gave rise to deep political and social debates. The discussions preceding the
privatization drove the government to be, probably, extremely cautious.
It is impossible to forget the atmosphere created against the Minister who
undertook, both as a patriot and with resolution, the task of leaving to the
private management such an important income as the Tobacco one, it may
happen that its in uence drove him to exaggerate the contractual conditions,
without seeing clearly its mistakes.
(Sant´õ as and de Figueroa, 1900: XVII)
The government selected the contractor very carefully. Nevertheless, one of
the main features of the privatization process was the mistrust which the
government exhibited towards the CAT, which was re ected both in the clauses
of the leasing contract and in the active intervention of the governmental
delegate. The tensions between the company and the state are well documented
in Com õ´ n and Mart´õ n Aceña (1999), who point out a number of areas of con ict
which sometimes had to be resolved in court.6
The leasing contract favoured the rise of uncertainty for two main reasons:
the term of the contract and the calculation of the rental. On the one hand,
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twelve years were considered by the Company as insuf cient to obtain an
adequate return if important investments were to be made, and the government
never gave any insights regarding a potential continuation of the lease. On the
other hand, the problems derived from the calculation of the rental have been
already described. Soon after the privatization, the company began to press for
a change in these conditions. In order to obtain more favourable contractual
conditions, it was important to build up a positive and solid reputation, and
annual reporting contributed to this issue.
By 1892, the company achieved one of these objectives. The Budgetary Law
of 30 June, article16 (AHBE, legajo 1, e22310) changed the calculation of the
results towards a system in which the  xed amount was to be 90 million pesetas
and establishing a variable share of the participation in pro ts. That is, if the net
income comprised between 90 and 96 million pesetas the participation of the
state in the surplus would be 50 per cent; from 96 to 100 the percentage would
be 60 per cent; and from 100 million up it would rise to 65 per cent. This reform
bene ted both the company and the state. The  xed canon increased, thus
assuring a higher minimum for the state, while, at the same time, assuring that
increases obtained in one period would not damage the interests of the company
in the following one. This was an important point, because the tobacco
consumption also depended on factors not controlled by the  rm as, for
instance, the organization of the  ght against smuggling, the economic cycle or
the existence of diseases or wars.
Another important factor arises from the organizational changes derived from
the reform of 24 April 1894. Throughout the period analysed in this paper, the
CAT was characterized by a strong concentration of power in the person of
the president and general manager which immediately created problems for the
company. The turnover of presidents was very high, as political motives
in uenced the replacement of incumbents. Thus, from 1887 to 1896, nine
different presidents held of ce (see Table 3). To ensure a smooth relationship
with the Treasury, the company needed a president who belonged to the political
party in of ce. For instance, Amos Salvador was appointed as president of the
company twice: on both occasions when his uncle, Sagasta, was elected president
of the government. As the roles of president and general manager were joined in
the same person, such a turnover impeded the normal day-to-day management
of the business, which lacked any long-term consistency.
The isolation of the business from political in uences and an increase in the
level of delegation in decision making and accountability were the major
objectives of the reform of 24 April 1894. The reform entailed the separation of
the roles of general manager and president. From then on, the role of the
president changed, leaving the management of the business to the general
manager with the help of three permanent commissioners of the board. The
reform established clearly the functions of the permanent commissioners, the
director and the president, thereby generating long-term consistency in the way
that the company was managed. This reform, however, did lead to con icts
between the members of the board not linked to the Bank of Spain and those
representing this institution. In 1894, and again in 1896, minority shareholders
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pursued an extension of the company’s mission and length both tied to the
leasing contract. However, the Bank impeded these reforms, arguing that these
extensions would cause an increase in risk (legajo 954, AHBE).
Changes in corporate reporting practices can be related to the importance of
uncertainty. However, it extends the notion of uncertainty, as disclosure practices
did not change immediately after the initial dif culties were overcome. The
perception of uncertainty appears to have been affected by the internal con icts
with the two major agents: the state and the Bank of Spain. Once these con-
 icts were solved, in one way or another, corporate reporting changed, reducing
dramatically the level of disclosure.
Discussion and conclusions
Accounting research assumes that the separation between ownership and control
lies at the heart of the emergence of corporate reporting. The nineteenth
century, by being characterized by both the existence of low regulatory
requirements and the emergence of modern corporations, has received a great
deal of attention in corporate reporting research. However, research has focused
on the Anglo-Saxon context, which appears to have been characterized by
peculiarities such as the predominance of stock markets as fund providers and
the existence of higher levels of competition. This paper adds evidence of a very
different context and of a somewhat different problem: the case of a
privatization. Privatization results in higher incentives to control due to two
main reasons: owners of private  rms are residual claimants and they can exert
a certain in uence on managers either directly, if they accumulate enough
control rights, or indirectly, selling their shares on the stock market. Managers
will become accountable to owners and accounting information represents a
basic means of assuring that they behave according to the owners’ interests.
Table 3 Presidents of the CAT (1887-96)
President Period Reason for dismissal
Camacho 1 July 1887–12 October 1887 Loss of government trust
Ruiz Gómez 12 October 1887–10 October 1888 Died
Amós Salvador 10 October 1888–27 October 1890 Change of government,
July 1890
Vida y Palacio 27 October 1890–13 December 1890 Died
Vizconde Campo
Grande
13 December 1890–11 December 1892 Change of government,
December 1892
Amós Salvador 16 December 1892–3 March 1894 Appointed Treasury
minister
Gonza´lez 27 July 1894–27 June 1895 Change of government,
March 1895
García
Barzanallana
10 July 1895–19 December 1895 Appointed Governor of
the Bank of Spain
Sa´nchez Bustillo 3 January 1896–29 September 1897 Change of government,
October 1897
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The privatization of the tobacco monopoly implied signi cant changes in
accountability. Under public management the responsibility of managers was
restricted to assuring the legal use of public resources. Public managers were not
aware of the pro tability of the industry, as distribution, manufacturing and raw
material acquisition were managed by different departments, simultaneously
developing other activities. Additionally, political instability and the subsequent
high turnover of head of cers under public administration presented serious
dif culties to an ef cient management of the industry. Inconsistency of norms
has been outlined as being important in explaining the separation between
decision making and action (Brunsson and Meyer, 1990). Privatization meant
the consideration of the business as a whole and the de nition of clear
boundaries.
Additionally, the company was subject to a double tutelage. On the one hand,
managers were accountable to shareholders, among which the Bank of Spain was
the most important. On the other hand, they were also accountable to the govern-
ment which placed a delegate inside the company with access to all the
accounting information and who could exert a veto on any decision made by
the company that could threaten the state’s interests.
The main conclusions of this paper refer to two different but related issues.
First, accounting played a central role both in enhancing and changing the
nature of accountability. The shift from public to private management led to a
different form of accountability which focused on  nancial and managerial
aspects, abandoning the former legal character. In this sense, accounting also
facilitated the de nition of clear boundaries within the  rm (Espelan and
Hirsch, 1990), framing the three basic activities that comprised till then the
public tobacco monopoly. Finally, another major role that might be distinguished
is the use of accounting information to project an image that the  rm was being
managed in an honest and ef cient manner. From the time of its creation, CAT
was concerned to renegotiate some of the clauses of its leasing contract, and
it was considered that accounting information could be used to develop closer
relationships with the state, and thereby help the company to achieve this
goal.
On the other hand, several determinants of accounting disclosure can be
outlined. First, and according to theoretical predictions, changes in ownership
derived from privatization in uenced the emergence of corporate reporting.
However, the research provides support for the idea that corporate reporting did
not change in a cause-effect manner, because of the change in the ownership
structure. Whereas the emergence of  nancial reporting can be linked to the
change in ownership that followed the privatization, the changes experienced by
the annual reports during the period under study clearly indicate the need to
seek other factors that might contribute to determine its nature.
The losses experienced by CAT in the  rst three years after privatization and
the subsequent need to ensure market capital, and satisfy the needs of public
regulators and shareholders could provide additional insights. However, the role
of market capital monitoring appears to be less than expected, due mainly to the
composition of the company’s capital. The important role of the Bank of Spain
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as fund provider through debt, and the stability of the  rm’s capital softened the
capital market in uence. The role of capital markets is considerably less
important in countries where  nancial institutions hold long-term relationships
with  rms, as is the case in most countries of Continental Europe. In this case,
 nancial institutions may have seats on the board of directors that allow them to
directly control management (Preveezer and Ricketts, 1994). Monitoring and
control costs will be lowered in such a context and it follows that the need for
publishing  nancial information will also be softened.
The conditions established by the lease contract and the subsequent strategies
implemented by the  rm, strongly in uenced both the scale and the content of
corporate reporting. The company tended to offer very detailed information
while it was seeking to obtain more favourable contractual conditions. Institu-
tional and contextual factors can be joined in a single variable: the level of
uncertainty the company had to face, which appears as one of the major
determinants of accounting disclosure (Sengupta, 1998).
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Notes
1 This six-year period witnessed a dethronement, a provisional regime, a regency, a
democratic monarchy, an abdication, a unitary republic, a federal republic, a coup d’e´tat
and,  nally, the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty. Eighteen different governments over
the period spanning 1868 to 1874 tried to re-establish order in a context that became
aggravated by a revolution in Cuba and two simultaneous civil wars (Comellas, 1996).
2 Tobacco income represented on average 12.5 per cent of total ordinary income in the
nineteenth century (López Linaje and Herna´ndez Andreu, 1990).
3 The contract included the possibility of the state obtaining a loan from the company
(article 19). The amount of this loan was  xed at 8 million pesetas per remaining year of
the contract which meant that, at the time of the concession, the state could claim a loan
of 96 million of pesetas. Additionally the contract required the lessee to deposit a fee (20
million pesetas). Loan, fee and minimum rental (90 million pesetas) represented a
considerable initial investment. Moreover, the lessee additionally had to acquire the
existing inventories of raw materials and stored products, which amount, though subject
to a bargaining process, to around 50.9 million pesetas (AHBE, Sec. 789). Putting all
these  gures together the investment could amount to 257 million pesetas, an amount
that should be added to the resources needed to run the daily operations.
4 The relationship between management and cigar rollers has been extensively studied
(see Valde´s, 1989; Baena, 1993; Ga´lvez Mun˜oz, 1997). Flexibility has been pointed to as
a characteristic of pre-industrial organizations (e.g. Jaffe, 1991; McBride, 1992). In the
tobacco monopoly,  exibility in work attendance and timetables appeared linked to
the incorporation of women into the factories during the early decades of the nineteenth
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
century. This  exibility allowed women to attend simultaneously to domestic duties and
their job, while piece-rate salaries and the existence of an abundant highly skilled
and socialized workforce relaxed the importance for management to control for time.
5 An example can be seen in the practice adopted by many companies from the mid-
nineteenth century of placing important politicians on their board of directors, giving
them a generous number of shares and economic bene ts in exchange for their political
in uence. Subsidies, administrative concessions and access to information were the major
returns companies expected to obtain (Mila´n, 2001: 401).
6 Con icts arose in seven main areas: fees, valuation of the products the company
should acquire from the State, the never ending bureaucratic procedures imposed by the
Treasury Ministry, the reform of the leasing contract, taxes, and costs to be accepted by
the Treasury as reducing the sales revenues (Comín and Martin Aceña, 1999:
107–10).
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